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ABSTRACT 
NCAA Division I Football Bowl Subdivision: 
The Importance of Recruiting and Its 
Relationship with 
Team Performance 
by 
Nathan S. Lloyd, Master of Science 
Utah State University, 2011 
Major Professor: Dr. Chris Fawson 
Department: Economics and Finance 
 
Talent wins college football games.  Wins bring in money.  Colleges, fans and media 
hype up the recruiting season as the key to success in the college football season.  Is it though? 
Athletic programs spend large sums of capital and resources to recruit the most talented players 
possible.  This paper explores the relationship between recruited talent and team performance 
using a simultaneous equations model.  Higher players’ talent leads to better team performance 
and a recruiting class has its biggest impact immediately following signing.  A team’s 
performance, especially of the most recent season, impacts its ability to recruit.  Talent and 
success experience bidirectional causation, meaning they concurrently cause each other.  The 
theory that top teams maintain top status is true. The theory holds true for all teams as well.  
Bidirectional causation proved here explains lack of performance mobility across all levels of the 
Division I Football Bowl Subdivision (FBS).   
(38 pages) 
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INTRODUCTION 
 Despite the amateur status of NCAA athletes, the Division I Football Bowl Subdivision 
(FBS) (formerly Division IA) is a booming commercial industry.  In 2009, the top football 
programs earned over $50 million in profits (Schwartz, 2009)!  Eighty-three of 118 reporting 
football programs were profitable, with thirty-five of them profiting over $10 million (U.S. 
Department of Education).  Attracting elite high school and junior college players to a program is 
assumed to translate into future wins, prestige and money for a program.  Robert Brown of Cal 
State University San Marcos estimates that a “premium” player - one later drafted into the NFL- 
adds $1.1 million of revenue to his university (Brown, 2011).   
Every year, college football programs spend huge amounts of time, money and effort in 
the competitive game off the field known as “recruiting”.  In 2001, the average Division IA 
program spent $526,000 on recruiting (Weiberg, 2003).  This amount jumped to over $750,000 
by the 2009 - 2010 academic year, and 29 schools in the FBS spent over $1 million in recruiting 
alone (U.S. Department of Education).  This does not even account for expenses related to 
recruiting such as scouting and phone bills which are reported to the Department of Education 
in a separate expense category.  It is also important to note that the NCAA limits recruiting 
activities.  The NCAA breaks down the calendar into different periods where varying levels of 
recruiting can occur.  Schools and coaches are limited by quotas in their official visits to 
prospective student-athletes1.  Student hosts can be paid a maximum of $30/day to cover 
entertainment for the host and prospect (NCAA bylaw 13.6.7.5).  Advertising for recruits is 
forbidden (NCAA bylaw 13.4.3.1).  These “collusive restrictions on payments” for recruiting 
                                                          
1
 For example, a football program is allowed 56 total official visits annually and the head coach is allowed 
just one day/year to visit each given prospective student-athlete (see NCAA bylaws 13.6.2.6 and 
13.1.2.6.2 for respective examples) (NCAA) 
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expenses and other factors of football production such as player compensation, are evidence to 
the NCAA’s cartel behavior (Kahn, 2007).  If not for these cartel-like behaviors of the NCAA 
which restrict recruiting, the expense would surely be much greater.   
A Sports Illustrated article entitled “A History of Recruiting” shows how important 
football programs perceive recruiting by revealing the great lengths that these programs will go 
to in order to innovate and work with NCAA bylaws.  One school recently produced comic books 
with their recruit prospects as the main character, leading the team to a national championship.  
These, along with personalized jerseys, text messaging and other creative recruiting tools have 
since been banned by the NCAA (Staples, 2008).  As of summer 2011, video chats, Facebook 
accounts and email, among other methods of recruiting, remain legal under NCAA bylaws.   
With all the cost and effort surrounding recruiting, one must ask, “Is it worth it? Do 
better recruits translate into more wins?”  Clearly a football team’s profit is a function of success 
on the field but is success a function of its players’ talent?  When do recruits begin to impact 
their team and by how much?  Does winning increase a team’s ability to attract elite recruits? 
Answering these critical questions aids athletic administrators and coaches in their jobs.  
Implications of this study may justify teams in their large expenditures related to recruiting.  
Results of this study should help teams in their planning and recruiting efforts of players.  
Knowing they operate in a cycle where recruiting leads to team performance which in turn leads 
to recruiting, and so forth, would provide insight into needed policy moves.  Athletic 
administrators could focus on breaking the cycle by hiring coaches more focused on recruiting, 
or more proven as great recruiters, expend more time and money on recruiting and less on 
stadium/facility enhancement, etc.   
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LITERARY REVIEW 
 Sports economics literature involving football falls into various main camps: those 
modeling production of wins as a function of performance statistics, those modeling attendance 
as a function of various determinants, literature about coaches, literature involving team 
performance and its effect on university variables, and those who study the recruiting aspect of 
the game.  An example of the first camp is the work by Keith Willoughby of Bucknell University.  
He studies winning in the Canadian Football League.  The dichotomous dependent variable 
representing win-loss is regressed on in-game statistics such as the difference in passing yards, 
rushing yards, turnovers, etc. between the observed team and its opponent.  Teams should 
control the line of scrimmage and focus on dominating these in-game statistics to win the game 
(Willoughby, 2002).  Related studies may differ in their selected explanatory performance 
statistics used, but most are attempting to model wins in this fashion in order to prescribe 
coaching policies and emphases for the game.  Some studies, such as Stephen Clarke’s, look at 
the effect of home field advantage in athletic competition (Clarke, 2005). 
 Timothy DeSchriver and Paul Jensen present an economic demand model for spectator 
attendance in NCAA Division II competitions.  Winning percentage and promotional activities 
such as homecoming positively affect attendance.  Winning’s effect on attendance grows as the 
season gets closer to the end (DeSchriver and Jensen, 2002).  Attendance has been studied in 
NCAA Division I as well.  A predictive model sets attendance as a function of game-specific, 
university-specific and team-specific determinants.  The recent on-field success of the home 
team, visiting team, tradition of the home team and being rivals are the biggest positive 
predictors of attendance demand (Price and Sen, 2003).  Conference realignment has an effect 
on attendance too.  Recently, many teams have changed conference affiliation for more 
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competitive conferences.  After controlling for the higher quality opponents, their attendance 
increases (Groza, 2010).   
Coaching is another area of football literature.  Amy Farmer and Paul Pecorino develop a 
model to show that under the NCAA’s “cartel agreement” to not provide player compensation, 
coaches’ salaries rise (Farmer and Pecorino, 2010).  Recently, Paul Holmes presents a model that 
uses logistic regression methods to estimate dismissal probability for FBS head coaches. 
Stronger recent team performance decreases the chance of dismissal but stronger historical 
performances of a team increase the chance of the current coach’s dismissal (Holmes, 2011).   
One niche in literature specific to college football involves the relationship between 
team performance and various university variables such as alumni donations, academic quality 
and state appropriations.  “Alumni giving” literature is divided and estimates of the effect a 
team’s success has on donations vary depending on what variables are used in the model, how 
“success” is defined, and whether the sample includes private or public universities (Kahn, 
2007).  A football program’s culture and tradition, more than on-field success, positively 
contribute to academic quality (Smith, 2009).  Although on-field success does not explain state-
government appropriations for universities, simply fielding a football team does (Humphreys, 
2006).  These are examples of the literature regarding football’s effects on campus activity. 
Another camp of literature involving college football focuses on the aspect of recruiting.  
Klenosky, Templin and Troutman of Purdue University present an economic model of the college 
football recruiting process (Klenosky, et. al, 2001).  They find that factors such as the coaching 
staff, playing time potential and playing on television have some significance in determining the 
recruit’s school of choice.  Dumond, Lynch and Platania model recruits as rational agents seeking 
to maximize their discounted expected utility.  They create a predictive model to determine the 
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likelihood a recruit will sign with a given school.  Factors influencing a recruit’s decisions, 
conditional on being offered the scholarship, include the distance between the school’s city and 
his hometown, whether or not the team is a “BCS” team, the team’s recent performance, 
academic reputation and media exposure (Dumond, et. al, 2008).  
This project aligns with a different aspect of recruiting literature however- exploring the 
relationship between recruiting and team performance.  George Langelett finds that teams with 
success on the field are able to attract quality recruits, which in turn increases the quality of 
future team performance.  Only the top 10 recruiting classes are observed along with the top 25 
teams for each year in his study; the data set he uses is not representative of Division I FBS 
(Langelett, 2003).  His feedback system between team performance and recruiting supports the 
phenomenon where top teams remain top teams.  My study seeks to test the generalized 
conclusions of Langelett.  I test if the immobile nature (in terms of performance) of the vast 
majority of teams across all FBS levels can be explained by the theory of bidirectional causation 
of recruiting and team performance. 
 To show the lack of mobility of teams across performance levels, consider the following 
facts: the net average change for a team’s rating from year to year is .021; for the median team 
of 2010, taking the average change would translate into the exact same ranking in 2011 (given 
the same team ratings of 2010 for the other teams).  The largest rating gain from year-to-year 
was 28.73 in my data set- even the bottom 48.7% of 2010 teams could not be ranked number 1 
next year with that kind of enormous improvement.  Also, in 13 years only 43 unique FBS teams 
have ever finished in the top 102.  Lack of performance mobility may be explained by 
bidirectional causation of team performance and recruiting. 
                                                          
2
 Author’s data calculations 
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THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
The buzz and hoopla surrounding National Signing Day3 and the entire recruitment 
season is based on the assumption that a talented recruiting class will convert into a high-
ranked football team over the next four years.  George Langelett showed this assumption to be 
true in his 2003 article, published in the Journal of Sports Economics.  I hypothesize this theory 
should be extended to the entire FBS.  If top talent leads to high team performance, the 
opposite should be true - low talent should produce lower ranked teams.  Theory suggests 
recruits affect team performance most their freshman year (year signed=red-shirt year, next 
year = freshman year), but the impact of a recruit is discounted over the remainder of his time 
with the program (Langelett, 2003).   
Another common perception is that teams with recent success will attract better 
recruits.  Specifically, theory states that a team’s performance best explains recruiting at its two-
year lag (Langelett, 2003).  This bidirectional theoretical framework of team performance and 
recruiting will be modeled empirically. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
3
 First Wednesday in February 
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ECONOMETRIC MODELING 
I propose a simultaneous equations model to test the theoretical hypotheses, because 
of the bidirectional nature of team performance and recruiting.  I take advantage of recruiting 
class data and team rankings now available for all teams in the FBS.  Following literature, the 
first equation (Equation I) includes Team Performance (TP) which is regressed solely on 
Recruiting Class talent (RC) and its lags.  Since players are given five years of eligibility when 
using a red-shirt year, they may affect a team’s performance over five years.  The fifth-year lag 
of recruiting classes is included in the model to control for this possibility.  Equation I appears as:  
Team Performance = f (Red-shirt, Freshman, Sophomore, Junior, Senior), 
or, alternatively in lag form:  
Team Performance = f (RC,      ,      ,     ,      ). 
Team Performance is the dependent variable of Equation I.  Using Jeff Sagarin’s 
computer ratings of all FBS teams, teams’ performance is measured by their end-of-season 
rating.  Like Groza, I use Sagarin ratings to represent recent on-field success (Groza, 2010).  
Sagarin ratings are used to measure team performance because of their validity in the sports 
world, being the supplier to the USA Today’s rankings.  Also, the Bowl Championship Series 
(BCS) uses Sagarin ratings to formulate their rankings and make decisions on their prestigious 
bowl game participants.  Other popular polls such as the AP Top 25 or BCS rankings are not used 
since these only rank the top teams, and not every team in the FBS.  Team ratings are used, as 
opposed to rankings, for accuracy of measurement since the difference between pairs of 
rankings is not equidistant, and to avoid censored data. 
Recruited talent of a team is represented by the recruiting ranking each entering class 
receives upon joining a team.  Every year, scout.com rates all players who sign with NCAA FBS 
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teams on a scale of 1-5 “stars”.  Recruits of the highest talent are given 5 stars, followed by 
those with 4 stars, etc. down to 1 for the least-talented recruits.  Scout.com awards points to 
every team, taking into account both their recruits’ absolute talent and their relative talent to 
other teams4.  Rankings are assigned each FBS team as determined by their overall point total5.  
Scout.com was acquired by Fox Interactive Company in 2005 to be a supplier of information to 
Fox Sports.  Scout.com and its affiliate in production, Superprep.com, are leaders of the 
recruiting information industry.   
Equation l is represented algebraically as follows:  
                                                           
where Y is the final team rating, i indexes the team of analysis, t is the index for time, α is the 
intercept term, ε is the error term to account for the random nature of models, and β is the 
coefficient for explanatory variable X, the team’s recruiting class ranking (RC).  RC and its four 
lags are included in the model to cover the time athletes play for a team.     is the beta 
coefficient for the recruiting class of the current year, or the red-shirt freshmen.     is the beta 
coefficient for the recruiting class of last year, or the current freshman players, and so forth.   
 Because recruiting is also affected by prior performance of a team, the empirical model 
is only accurate with the inclusion of Equation II.  This tests the theory that a high school player 
uses current teams’ performance to choose where to attend school.  Dumond, Lynch and 
Platania showed that a team’s current performance is a major factor in a recruit’s decision of 
where to play in college (Dumond, et. al, 2008).  Equation II is given as: 
                                                          
4
 The formula is based on a player’s rating and ranking: 5-star=200 points, 4-star=120 points, 3-star=40 
points, 2-star=20 points, 1-star=0 points.  The number 1-ranked player (assuming 100 players in his 
position) of a position=100 points, number 2=99 points, down to number 100=1 point.  A maximum of 25 
recruits/team are evaluated towards a team’s points and ranking.  
5
 These rankings are updated regularly and slightly change from time to time. My data was last updated 
July 2011. 
9 
 
Recruiting Class = g (Senior HS, Junior HS, Sophomore HS, Freshman HS), 
which allows for the player’s four years of high school attendance and his decision period.  This 
is shown alternatively with team performance lags: 
Recruiting Class = g (     ,      ,      ,      ) 
Algebraically, this becomes: 
                                                   
where Y is the recruiting class ranking, i indexes the team of analysis, t is the index for time, α is 
the intercept term, ε is the error term to account for the random nature of models, and β is the 
coefficient for explanatory variable X, the team’s performance (TP).  Four lags are included in 
the model to cover the time recruits attend high school and scout their potential future teams.  
   is the beta coefficient for the team performance last year, or while the recruits are seniors in 
high school.     is the beta coefficient for the team’s performance two years ago, or while the 
recruits are juniors in high school, and so forth.   
All teams in the FBS are observed for the data set.  The cross section of teams is studied 
over time, using data from 1998 to the present.  The frequency of data is yearly- for each 
season.  With 120 teams under observation for 14 years, 1649 total observations will be 
included in this data set with the final year of data being incomplete6.  Explanatory variables of 
Equation I are observed for 2011, but not the dependent variable.  Recruiting rankings are 
observable from 2002 on, while team ratings are available since 1998.  With four lags needed in 
Equation I, there is enough data to begin the data series in 2006, lasting six years, ending with 
2011 inclusive.  For Equation II, there is enough data to begin the data series in 2002.  This panel 
                                                          
6
 8 schools unbalance the panel since their teams are newer than 1998.  Buffalo and Middle Tennessee 
began in 1999, UConn in 2000, South Florida and Troy in 2001, FAU and Florida International in 2004, and 
Western Kentucky in 2007.  They are not thrown out of the data in order to keep the results unbiased 
(Most these teams are from the bottom half of the team ratings). 
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study gleans data from various sources: Scout.com, Sports-reference.com, ESPN.go.com and 
USA Today7. 
To summarize, the empirical model (Model I) of simultaneous equations is given as: 
Equation I: TP = f (RC,     ,      ,     ,     ) 
Equation II: RC = g (     ,     ,     ,      ) 
All the variables used are displayed in the table below: 
List of Variables 
Variable: Represents: 
TP (Dependent) Team performance- Final Sagarin 
rating of the year 
RC (Explanatory in Equation I, 
Dependent in Equation II) 
Recruiting Class Ranking (#1 is 
best) of current red-shirt players 
RC, t-1 (Explanatory in Equation 
I, along with remaining RC lags) 
RC’s 1st lag or current freshman 
players 
RC, t-2 RC’s 2nd lag or current 
sophomore players 
RC, t-3 RC’s 3rd lag or junior players 
RC, t-4 RC’s final lag or senior players 
TP, t-1 (Explanatory in Equation 
II, as are the remaining variables) 
Team Performance’s 1st lag 
TP, t-2 Team Performance’s 2nd lag 
TP, t-3 Team Performance’s 3rd lag 
TP, t-4 Team Performance’s 4th lag 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
7
 http://www.usatoday.com/sports/sagarin-archive.htm 
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Team Performance and Recruiting Class Rankings have the following descriptive 
statistics: 
Summary Statistics8 
TP RC 
Mean 70.8236 Mean 59.1121 
Standard Error 0.3144 Standard Error 0.9860 
Median 71.23 Median 59 
Mode 65.9 Mode 107 
Standard Deviation 12.2956 Standard Deviation 33.7130 
Sample Variance 151.1806 Sample Variance 1136.5670 
Kurtosis -0.30 Kurtosis -1.1766 
Skewness -0.0930 Skewness 0.0038 
Range 76.46 Range 119 
Minimum 30.47 Minimum 1 
Maximum 106.93 Maximum 120 
Count 1529 Count 1190 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
8
 All output values throughout the paper are rounded to the nearest ten-thousandth 
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ESTIMATION 
Estimation of the empirical model is performed with the instrumental variable 
technique using the Three-Stage Least Squares (3SLS) and Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) 
regression methods.  This is accomplished using R software and its “Systemfit” package, which 
includes functions for simultaneous equations and testing data.  The 3SLS and 2SLS estimators 
are chosen as opposed to Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) because the OLS estimator is biased in 
simultaneous equations (Hamann and Henningsen, 2007).  The disturbance term of one 
equation and a regressor are correlated9, violating Assumption Three (exogeneity of the 
independent variables) of the Classical Linear Regressions Model (Greene, 2008).  Weighted 
Least Squares (WLS) and Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) are not estimators of choice 
either since they rely on the assumption of exogeneity. 
Given that variable RC is an endogenous explanatory variable in Equation I, the 
instrumental variable technique is used for estimation.  A proper choice for an instrumental 
variable is one that is not correlated to the disturbance term, but is correlated with the 
endogenous regressor (Greene, 2008).  To instrument for endogenous variables in simultaneous 
equations, exogenous variables are used (Hamann and Henningsen, 2007).  For this model, RC 
and its four lags along with TP’s four lags are all proper instrument choices.  Langelett used only 
3SLS estimation, but 3SLS here tests negative for consistency using the Hausman Specification 
Test, shown in the next table (Langelett, 2003).  Under the null hypothesis of this test, all 
exogenous variables are uncorrelated with all disturbance terms (Hamann and Henningsen, 
2007).  Therefore, 3SLS is inconsistent and 2SLS is the preferred estimator for this study. 
                                                          
9
 Precisely, the Equation II disturbance term is correlated with Equation II’s RC since RC is an endogenous 
variable.  When the disturbance is high, RC is high too, which simultaneously raises RC in equation I. 
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Hausman Specification Test 
Data Model I 
Hausman Test Statistic 171.1664 
Degrees of Freedom 11 
P-value <2.2e-16 
 
Model I’s output10 is summarized below: 
Model I Output (2SLS)11 
Equation I 
Adj. R-squared:  
.4846 
Coefficient 
Estimates 
Standard Error T-Value Significance 
Intercept  85.7842 0.7190 119.3181 *** 
RC  -0.0833 0.0239 -3.4846 *** 
RC_1 -0.0475 0.0247 -1.9258 . 
RC_2 -0.0787 0.0257 -3.0596 ** 
RC_3 -0.0515 0.0253 -2.0375 * 
RC_4 0.0118 0.0239 0.4931  
Significance Code  *** .001  ** .01  *.05  .    .10  
Equation II 
Adj. R-squared:  
.5984 
Coefficient 
Estimates 
Standard Error T-Value Significance 
Intercept  240.9283 6.1835 38.9632 *** 
TP_1  -0.8621 0.1231 -7.0013 *** 
TP_2  -0.4894 0.1329 -3.6830 *** 
TP_3  -0.5306 0.1318 -4.0247 *** 
TP_4  -0.6778 0.1193 -5.6798 *** 
Significance Code  *** .001  ** .01  *.05  .    .10  
 
                                                          
10 The estimation of systems of equations with unequal numbers of observations has not been thoroughly 
tested yet, therefore lowering the n observations to 591 (Hamann and Henningsen, 2007) 
11
 See Appendix A for output results using the 3SLS estimator 
14 
 
All variables are statistically significant and their coefficient estimates have the expected 
negative sign, with the exception of RC_4.  This exception is an inaccurate result that is fixed in 
Model II.  For Equation I and II, recruiting class rankings are set up so that lower is better.  The 
top recruiting class each year is awarded the #1 ranking.  The worst recruiting class is ranked 
#12012.  Higher ratings for teams indicate better performance.  Therefore, for better recruiting 
classes to lead to higher team performance, the negative sign is expected.  For recent on-field 
success to attract more talented recruits, the negative coefficient sign is also correct.   
The model tests negative for heteroscedasticity using the Studentized Breusch-Pagan 
Test.  I fail to reject the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity as seen in the following table: 
Studentized Breusch-Pagan Test 
Data Equation I Equation II 
BP test statistic 2.32 2.3081 
Degrees of Freedom 5 4 
P-value .8031 .6793 
 
However, the model tests positive for multicollinearity.  The following tables show the 
correlation between variables which indicates the problem of collinearity: 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
12
 120 teams have existed since 2007, 119 from 2004-2006, 117 from 2001-2003, 115 in 2000, 114 in 
1999, and 112 in 1998 
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Equation I 
Correlation13 
TP RC RC_1 RC_2 RC_3 RC_4 
TP 1 -.67 -.66 -.67 -.66 -.62 
RC -.67 1 .87 .87 .86 .85 
RC_1 -.66 .87 1 .87 .86 .85 
RC_2 -.67 .87 .87 1 .88 .86 
RC_3 -.66 .86 .86 .88 1 .87 
RC_4 -.62 .85 .85 .86 .87 1 
 
Equation II 
Correlation 
RC TP_1 TP_2 TP_3 TP_4 
RC 1 -.68 -.68 -.67 -.66 
TP_1 -.68 1 .75 .66 .61 
TP_2 -.68 .75 1 .74 .66 
TP_3 -.67 .66 .74 1 .73 
TP_4 -.66 .61 .66 .73 1 
 
An absolute value of 0.8 or greater correlation between two variables is considered high 
collinearity, while .5 - .8 is the range used for moderate collinearity (Kennedy, 2008).  The high 
multicollinearity in Equation I explains the strange exception found in this equation.  To correct 
for multicollinearity, OLS regressions are run on each explanatory variable, following literary 
practice (Langelett, 2003).  These results are shown at continuation and summarized as “Model 
II”: 
 
 
                                                          
13
 Figures in correlation tables rounded to nearest one-hundredth 
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Model II Output (Separate Regressions) 
Equation I: 
Dependent 
Variable – TP 
Adj. R-
squared 
Constant14 Coefficient 
Estimates 
Standard 
Error 
T-Value Significance 
RC .4423 84.6850 -0.2305 .0080 -28.85 *** 
RC_1 .4270 84.4033 -0.2259 .0085 -26.43 *** 
RC_2 .4276 84.3528 -0.2244 .0090 -24.80 *** 
RC_3 .4354 84.5547 -0.2264 .0010 -23.37 *** 
RC_4 .3887 83.7198 -0.2133 .0110 -19.40 *** 
 
Equation II: 
Dependent 
Variable – RC 
Adj. R-
squared 
Constant Coefficient 
Estimates 
Standard 
Error 
T-Value Significance 
TP_1 .4688 197.0505 -1.9434 0.0605 -32.12 *** 
TP_2 .4636 193.9419 -1.9021 0.0598 -31.79 *** 
TP_3 .4433 189.1465 -1.8346 0.0601 -30.51 *** 
TP_4 .4394 185.2543 -1.7810 0.0588 -30.27 *** 
Significance  *** .001  ** .01  *.05  .    .10    
 
RC_4 in the Team Performance Equation now has the expected negative sign for its 
coefficient estimate and all explanatory variables in both equations are highly significant.  The 
most recent class to sign has the strongest impact on team performance.  This will include 
freshmen, but mostly red-shirt players.  This contradicts the hypothesis suggesting that the first 
lag, or mostly freshman players, has the strongest effect.  The recruiting class with the second 
highest impact (by evaluating coefficient estimates) on team performance is the third lag, or 
mostly junior players.  This result is intuitive because recruits should grow and improve in their 
coach’s system, and by their final years be playing more than the other players.   With junior 
                                                          
14
 See Appendix B for the constants’ standard error, T-Value and significance level values 
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players (and senior players who have not red-shirted) producing more minutes played, their 
talent should have a greater impact on their team’s performance than the previous two lags.    
Team Performance is found to significantly explain recruiting.  Contrary to the 
hypothesis, TP_1, or a team’s performance while a recruit is a senior in high school, has the 
strongest impact on recruiting.  This result is instinctive, since high school recruits make final 
decisions on where to play during their senior year.  High school recruits appear to base their 
decision off of the most recent on-field results. 
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CONCLUSIONS AND SHORTCOMINGS 
 These models show a “feedback” system in the college football market.  More work 
could be done to study the Team Performance Equation.  Theory states that the freshmen 
(recruiting class talent lagged one year) most impact a team’s performance, while this study 
found the first year recruiting class to most impact the team’s success.  Perhaps less athletes are 
red-shirting than when George Langelett studied this issue.  Maybe the composition of recruits 
is changing with the junior college & transfer/high school recruit ratio rising.  I believe talent’s 
role in the college football market, including coaching talent, needs to be better understood.  
Because recruiting classes experience their strongest effect on team performance right after 
signing, further study needs to determine if coaching talent is explaining team performance 
after the first year.  Other factors besides coaching talent may explain the diminished recruiting 
effect on team performance.  Perhaps the model should be expanded to include other variables.   
 Schools in the FBS expend significant amounts of resources on recruiting.  Equation I 
proves that recruiting impacts team performance.  Schools are validated in their actions by this 
evidence.  Recruits significantly impact their team years after signing, with their impact being 
largest the first year.  Team performance in turn affects recruiting.  Prospective FBS football 
players appear to base their decision of where to play mainly on the most recent college football 
results, while they are seniors in high school.  The bidirectional causation theory of recruiting 
talent and team performance extends from its application of top teams to the entire FBS and 
explains the lack of team performance mobility from year to year. 
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Appendix A – Model I Output (3SLS) 
Equation I 
Adj. R-squared:  
.4606 
Coefficient 
Estimates 
Standard Error T-Value Significance 
Intercept  87.9945 .7085 124.2045 *** 
RC  -0.1816 .0227 -8.0137 *** 
RC_1 -0.0295 .0234 -1.2617  
RC_2 -0.0624 .0244 -2.5600 * 
RC_3 -0.0340 .0240 -1.4161  
RC_4 0.0207 .0226 .9153  
Significance Code  *** .001  ** .01  *.05  .    .10  
Equation II 
Adj. R-squared:  
.5952 
Coefficient 
Estimates 
Standard Error T-Value Significance 
Intercept  247.6817 6.0701 40.8034 *** 
TP_1  -1.1067 .1169 -9.4668 *** 
TP_2  -.4454 .1260 -3.5333 *** 
TP_3  -.5090 .1251 -4.0698 *** 
TP_4  -0.5934 .1133 -5.2368 *** 
Significance Code  *** .001  ** .01  *.05  .    .10  
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Appendix B – Model II’s Output of Intercepts 
 
Equation I: 
Dependent 
Variable – TP 
Adj. R-
squared 
Constant SE T-Value Significance 
RC .4423 84.6850 .5423 156.17 *** 
RC_1 .4270 84.4033 .5810 145.28 *** 
RC_2 .4276 84.3528 .6160 136.9 *** 
RC_3 .4354 84.5547 .6620 127.72 *** 
RC_4 .3887 83.7198 .7535 111.10 *** 
Equation II: 
Dependent 
Variable – RC 
Adj. R-
squared 
Constant SE T-Value Significance 
TP_1 .4688 197.0505 4.3544 45.25 *** 
TP_2 .4636 193.9419 4.3023 45.08 *** 
TP_3 .4433 189.1465 4.3247 43.74 *** 
TP_4 .4394 185.2543 4.2318 43.78 *** 
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Appendix C – R Code 
## Counting profits, recruiting expenses... 
setwd("C:\\Users\\Nate\\Desktop") 
dat <- read.csv("thesis.csv", header=T) 
head(dat) 
n<-nrow(dat) 
dat$profit <- rep("", n) 
head(dat) 
for (i in 1:n) { 
  if (dat$Revenues[i] > dat$Expenses[i])  
  dat$profit[i]<-1 
  else dat$profit[i]<-0 
} 
head(dat) 
table(dat$profit) 
dat$prof.amount<-dat$Revenues - dat$Expenses 
head(dat) 
dat 
dat$profit.10m <- rep("",n) 
head(dat) 
for (i in 1:n) { 
  if (dat$prof.amount[i] > 9999999)  
  dat$profit.10m[i]<-1 
  else dat$profit.10m[i]<-0 
} 
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head(dat,20) 
table(dat$profit.10m) 
max(dat$prof.amount) 
outfile <- "C:\\Users\\Nate\\Desktop\\footballprofit.csv" 
write.table(dat, file=outfile, quote=FALSE, sep=",", row.names=FALSE, col.names=TRUE) 
 
## For recruiting expenses 
dat <- read.csv("ADprofit.csv", header=T) 
head(dat) 
n<-nrow(dat) 
dat$RE.1m <- rep("", n) 
head(dat) 
for (i in 1:n) { 
  if (dat$Total[i] > 999999)  
  dat$RE.1m[i]<-1 
  else dat$RE.1m[i]<-0 
} 
head(dat) 
table(dat$RE.1m) 
## Save together 
dat$prof.amount<-dat$Revenues - dat$Expenses 
head(dat) 
dat$profit.10m <- rep("",n) 
head(dat) 
for (i in 1:n) { 
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  if (dat$prof.amount[i] > 9999999)  
  dat$profit.10m[i]<-1 
  else dat$profit.10m[i]<-0 
} 
head(dat,20) 
table(dat$profit.10m) 
max(dat$prof.amount) 
outfile <- "C:\\Users\\Nate\\Desktop\\ADprofit.csv" 
write.table(dat, file=outfile, quote=FALSE, sep=",", row.names=FALSE, col.names=TRUE) 
## Repeated for csv with 2003 figures 
 
## Code for getting variable absolute difference: 
setwd("C:\\Users\\Nate\\Desktop") 
dat<-read.csv("Sagarin.csv", header=T) 
head(dat) 
dat<-dat[1:9] 
head(dat) 
dat$Difference <- abs(dat$Difference) 
head(dat) 
outfile <- "C:\\Users\\Nate\\Desktop\\Sagarin.csv" 
write.table(dat, file=outfile, quote=FALSE, sep=",", row.names=FALSE, col.names=TRUE) 
 
## Code for obtaining range variable: 
 
rang<-list() 
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for (i in 1:120) { 
  rang[[i]] <- range(tmpdat[[i]]$Rating) 
} 
rang 
 
## Equation I code of Simultaneous System 
# Creating lags for RC ranking 
setwd("C:\\Users\\Nate\\Desktop") 
dat <- read.csv("sagarin.csv", header=T) 
head(dat) 
dat<-dat[1:11] 
head(dat) 
teams <- as.character(unique(dat$Team)) 
teams 
length(teams) 
tmp <- list() 
dat$Team <- as.character(dat$Team) 
dat$Conf.11<- as.character(dat$Conf.11) 
tmpdat <- list() 
for(i in 1:120) { tmpdat[[i]] <- dat[dat$Team == teams[i], ]; } 
tmpdat[[1]] 
newdat <- list() 
tmp <- tmpdat[[1]] 
lags <- 4 
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for(i in 1:120) { tmp <- tmpdat[[i]]; n <- nrow(tmp); newdat[[i]] <- cbind(tmp$Rating[(lags+1):n], 
tmp$Year[(lags+1):n], tmp$Conf.11[(lags+1):n],embed(tmp$RC, lags+1)); } 
newdat 
newdat <- do.call("rbind", newdat) 
newdat <- list() 
for(i in 1:120) { tmp <- tmpdat[[i]]; n <- nrow(tmp); newdat[[i]] <- cbind(tmp$Rating[(lags+1):n], 
tmp$Year[(lags+1):n], tmp$Conf.11[(lags+1):n], embed(tmp$RC, lags+1)); } 
names(newdat) <- teams 
for(i in 1:120) { n <- nrow(newdat[[i]]); newdat[[i]] <- cbind(rep(names(newdat[[i]]), n), newdat[[i]]) }  
newdat 
data.class(names(newdat)) 
tmp 
n <- nrow(tmp) 
new <- cbind(tmp$Rating[(lags+1):n], tmp$Year[(lags+1):n], tmp$Conf.11[(lags+1):n],embed(tmp$RC, 
lags+1)) 
nm <- unique(as.character(tmp$Team)) 
n <- nrow(new) 
nate <- data.frame(cbind(rep(nm, n), new)) 
newdat <- list() 
names(tmpdat) <- teams 
tmpdat 
 
for(i in 1:120) { n <- nrow(tmpdat[[i]]); newdat[[i]] <- data.frame(Team=rep(teams[i], n-lags), 
Rating=tmpdat[[i]]$Rating[(lags+1):n], Year=tmpdat[[i]]$Year[(lags+1):n], 
Conf.11=tmpdat[[i]]$Conf.11[(lags+1):n],embed(tmpdat[[i]]$RC, lags+1)); } 
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newdat <- do.call("rbind", newdat) 
newdat 
names(newdat) <- c("Team", "Rating", "Year", "Conf.11", "RC", "RC_1", "RC_2", "RC_3", "RC_4") 
head(newdat,25) 
outfile <- "C:\\Users\\Nate\\Desktop\\Model4.csv" 
write.table(newdat, file=outfile, quote=FALSE, sep=",", row.names=FALSE, col.names=TRUE) 
 
#####  Equation II of Simultaneous Eq system 
# Creating lags for Team Performance (Rating) 
setwd("C:\\Users\\Nate\\Desktop") 
dat <- read.csv("sagarin.csv", header=T) 
dat<-dat[1:11] 
head(dat) 
teams <- as.character(unique(dat$Team)) 
teams 
length(teams) 
tmp <- list() 
dat$Team <- as.character(dat$Team) 
dat$Conf.11<- as.character(dat$Conf.11) 
tmpdat <- list() 
for(i in 1:120) { tmpdat[[i]] <- dat[dat$Team == teams[i], ]; } 
tmpdat[[1]] 
newdat <- list() 
tmp <- tmpdat[[1]] 
lags <- 4 
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for(i in 1:120) { tmp <- tmpdat[[i]]; n <- nrow(tmp); newdat[[i]] <- cbind(tmp$RC[(lags+1):n], 
tmp$Year[(lags+1):n], tmp$Conf.11[(lags+1):n],embed(tmp$Rating, lags+1)); } 
newdat 
newdat <- do.call("rbind", newdat) 
newdat <- list() 
for(i in 1:120) { tmp <- tmpdat[[i]]; n <- nrow(tmp); newdat[[i]] <- cbind(tmp$RC[(lags+1):n], 
tmp$Year[(lags+1):n], tmp$Conf.11[(lags+1):n], embed(tmp$Rating, lags+1)); } 
names(newdat) <- teams 
for(i in 1:120) { n <- nrow(newdat[[i]]); newdat[[i]] <- cbind(rep(names(newdat[[i]]), n), newdat[[i]]) }  
newdat 
data.class(names(newdat)) 
tmp 
n <- nrow(tmp) 
new <- cbind(tmp$RC[(lags+1):n], tmp$Year[(lags+1):n], tmp$Conf.11[(lags+1):n],embed(tmp$Rating, 
lags+1)) 
nm <- unique(as.character(tmp$Team)) 
n <- nrow(new) 
nate <- data.frame(cbind(rep(nm, n), new)) 
newdat <- list() 
names(tmpdat) <- teams 
tmpdat 
 
for(i in 1:120) { n <- nrow(tmpdat[[i]]); newdat[[i]] <- data.frame(Team=rep(teams[i], n-lags), 
RC=tmpdat[[i]]$RC[(lags+1):n], Year=tmpdat[[i]]$Year[(lags+1):n], 
Conf.11=tmpdat[[i]]$Conf.11[(lags+1):n],embed(tmpdat[[i]]$Rating, lags+1)); } 
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newdat <- do.call("rbind", newdat) 
newdat 
names(newdat) <- c("Team", "RC", "Year", "Conf.11", "Rating", "Rating_1", "Rating_2", "Rating_3", 
"Rating_4") 
head(newdat,25) 
outfile <- "C:\\Users\\Nate\\Desktop\\Model5.csv" 
write.table(newdat, file=outfile, quote=FALSE, sep=",", row.names=FALSE, col.names=TRUE) 
 
## Model II contains everything to now run Simultaneous EQ Code: 3SLS 
setwd("C:\\Users\\Nate\\Desktop") 
dat <- read.csv("Model2.csv", header=TRUE) 
library(systemfit) 
data.frame(dat) 
dat1 <- na.omit(dat) 
library(plm) 
dat2 <- pdata.frame(dat1, index=c("Team"), drop.index=TRUE, row.names=TRUE) 
head(dat2) 
 
I <- Rating ~ RC + RC_1 + RC_2 + RC_3 + RC_4 
II <- RC ~ Rating_1 + Rating_2 + Rating_3 + Rating_4  
inst <- ~RC + RC_1 + RC_2 + RC_3 + RC_4 + Rating_1 + Rating_2 + Rating_3 + Rating_4  
system <- list(I=I, II=II) 
fit3sls <- systemfit(system, method = "3SLS", inst = inst, data = dat2) 
summary(fit3sls) 
fit2sls <- systemfit(system, method = "2SLS", inst = inst, data=dat2) 
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summary(fit2sls) 
## NB: Pooled by default = false. Same results as if pooled=TRUE in system fit function 
 
## Hausman Specification test: 
h<-hausman.systemfit(fit2sls, fit3sls) 
print(h) 
## Reject the Null hypothesis - 3SLS is inconsistent 
 
## Test for Heteroskedasticity 
bptest(I, data=dat) 
bptest(II, data=dat) 
## Homoskedasticity assumption holds 
 
## Test for multicollinearity: EQ I 
T<-(cbind(dat$Rating, dat$RC, dat$RC_1, dat$RC_2, dat$RC_3, dat$RC_4)) 
T<-as.matrix(T) 
T<-na.omit(T) 
cor(T) 
## Very Large collinearity (>.8) 
## Multicollinearity: EQ II 
T<-(cbind(dat$RC, dat$Rating_1, dat$Rating_2, dat$Rating_3, dat$Rating_4)) 
T<-as.matrix(T) 
T<-na.omit(T) 
cor(T) 
## Moderate Collinearity (<.8) 
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## Model III: separate regression for each variable: 
dat <- read.csv("Model2.csv", header=TRUE) 
mod1.RC <- lm(Rating ~ RC, data=dat) 
summary(mod1.RC) 
mod1.RC_1 <- lm(Rating ~ RC_1, data=dat) 
summary(mod1.RC_1) 
mod1.RC_2 <- lm(Rating ~ RC_2, data=dat) 
summary(mod1.RC_2) 
mod1.RC_3 <- lm(Rating ~ RC_3, data=dat) 
summary(mod1.RC_3) 
mod1.RC_4 <- lm(Rating ~ RC_4, data=dat) 
summary(mod1.RC_4) 
 
## Equation II: 
Rating1 <- lm(RC ~ Rating_1, data=dat) 
summary(Rating1) 
Rating2 <- lm(RC ~ Rating_2, data=dat) 
summary(Rating2) 
Rating3 <- lm(RC ~ Rating_3, data=dat) 
summary(Rating3) 
Rating4 <- lm(RC ~ Rating_4, data=dat) 
summary(Rating4) 
 
